

Coercive Diplomacy: Camp David 2000

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ABSTRACT

July 2000 hosted the most significant talks at Camp David bringing the final status issues to the negotiating table. However, no deal was completed; moreover, since then, violence and instability have escalated in the region, with the arrival of President Donald Trump to the White House, the Palestinian/Israeli peace process had taken a dramatic shift mainly because of the decisions that the administration had adopted regarding the final status issues; and more specifically on Jerusalem and refugees, which were finalized with the so called Trump Peace To Prosperity Plan. This paper sheds light on the theory of Coercive Diplomacy and applies it into the Palestinian/Israeli negotiations taking the Camp David 2000 Peace talks as case study and then examining what was presented at those talks in relation to what is now being implemented by the current US administration which dared to translate previous threats into reality. Reviewing past literature and relying on a number of books and conducting interviews with prominent negotiators from the American, Palestinian and the Israeli sides who participated at those peace talks, the study tells the true story of Camp David, demonstrates Coercive Diplomacy in Practice as it illustrates how the third party mediators have strongly crossed their limits by abandoning their role as mediators and by wearing the hats of interveners, the paper also demonstrates how Trump's arrangement to an extent considered what was discussed at Camp David.

Keywords: Coercive Diplomacy ; Peace Process ; Camp David 2000 ; Trump; Deal of Century.

Introduction

The Arab-Israeli conflict emerged as one of the competing nationalisms claiming the same territory. Increased Jewish immigration and institution building followed by the British mandate heightened the dissatisfaction with the British rule while mutual suspicion and fear led to the use of force for political ends; as a result, zero-sum perceptions of the conflict brought about the belief that coexistence was impossible. There were however, international influences through British and later American policies, Arab support through the subsequent attacks after the expiry of the British mandate and the establishment of the state of Israel. In 1948, the state of Israel was created and in the Six Day War in 1967, the borders of the recently created state were expanded. Events continued to escalate and develop until the year of 1991 brought a new way of dealing with the conflict through negotiations.

Differences would no longer be settled through force and violence but by diplomatic means. The preamble of the 1993 Declaration of Principles stated that it was time for both Israelis and Palestinians "to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict." The peace process started with an understanding that a concrete improvement would be delivered during the interim period, which had to be relatively short in duration with a sovereign independent state for the Palestinians by end of 1999. Moreover, the interim agreement had to comply with the international resolutions. In fact, the peace process delivered none of these aspirations; Palestinians suffered more restrictions on their movement and this was accompanied with a serious decline in their economic situation, the Israeli colonies expanded, and the West Bank and Gaza became more fragmented with the construction of the settler "by-pass" roads and the proliferation of the Israeli military checkpoints. On the other hand, Israelis lived with the fear of ramming or suicide bombings which were perpetuated in buses, cafes, shopping centres and universities; in addition to the huge decrease in their economy.

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When violence erupted in the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in September 2000. Most of the international community traced the reason back to the failure of the Camp David summit of July 2000. Israel and the American administration which had been playing the role of the mediator concluded that the Palestinian refusal to the proposed paper at the summit was the reason behind the deadlocks. Debates arose on these talks taking different angles; whose mistake was it, what was proposed and to what extent are these talks important as a foundation for any coming deal? On the ground, imposed facts by the Israelis in dealing with the Palestinians have ultimately undermined the possibility of positive outcomes in the context of the peace process, this paper will touch upon the concepts of conflict resolution and its tools of mediation and negotiations, the concept of sanctions and the carrot and stick approaches in international relations, in addition to focus on coercive diplomacy Vs Mediation. The paper argues that through applying Coercive Diplomacy rather than mediation, the Americans played an immense role in paralyzing the peace talks. (Lesch, 2003, pp. 260-263).

The paper will introduce a theoretical background on Coercive Diplomacy and will take Camp David 2000 as a case study in an attempt to answer the thesis question in this paper:

- Was Coercive Diplomacy conducted in the mediation process between Israel and Palestine at the time of the Camp David talks and whether those talks of July 2000 had influenced the status quo in recent years.

In order to be able to answer this question, the paper will also try to find answers to the following question:

- What is Coercive Diplomacy?
- Was Coercive Diplomacy practiced in Camp David 2000?
- What was offered at Camp David?
- To what extent did the Americans and Israelis coerce the Palestinians?
- How is the Trump's plan influenced by Camp David?
- Why did the Peace Process fall apart?

Literature Review

In order to answer all previous questions, the scope and analysis of this study has strongly relied on the Palestinian chief negotiator's personal minutes [Saeb Erekat.] Since the summit was not documented, the minutes provided me with most of the unpublished conversations, events, and true stories that occurred at Camp David. In order to link theory to practice, a number of Interviews have taken place through out the research period with high-ranking officials on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides including Yasser Arafat, Gilead Sher, Akram Hanyeh. Abu Ala'. "Ahmad Qurieh", Abu Mazen. "Mahmoud Abbas", Aron Miller and Saeb Erekat.

Moreover, the paper relied on books and articles which tackled this period of the peace process (Akram Hanyeh, (Hanyeh, 2000) Bill Clinton, (Clinton, 2004) (Charles, 2003) Shlomo Bin Ami, (Shlomo, 2006) Charles Anderlin (Charles, 2003) and others), in his book, Clinton focuses on putting the blame on Arafat and the Palestinians for yet wasting another opportunity for peace, while Charles Anderlin brings about more details in a descriptive journalistic manner, while Bin Ami tries to show how the Palestinians didn't come with a counter proposal and he accuses Arafat of committing crime against the Palestinians by saying that he is the reason behind the failure, Hanyeh from his part tries to tell the Palestinian story of the details of Camp David.

Many articles have been published since Camp David 2000, the majority of which blamed the Palestinians for the failure of the talks and were basically defending Israel,

(Krylov, 2017) touched upon Camp David in their study on American diplomacy and the permanent status negotiations between the conflicting parties under the US mediation within the framework of the previous agreements which were discussed in the 2000 summit in Camp David, they conclude that the US diplomatic success in resolving disputable issues between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s, does not work on the Palestinian track, the US diplomacy with Egypt did not succeed with the Palestinians.

(Oren, 2007) describes the mutual delegitimization between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians, focusing on the

context of violent confrontations that broke out following failure of the Camp David summit of 2000.

(Lehrs., 2016) explores the negotiating processes that took place between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the question of Jerusalem since the Oslo Accords (1993), with attention to the Camp David Process (2000-1) and the Annapolis Process (2007-8). Assessment of these processes reveals that the question of Jerusalem posed one of the major obstacles to agreement. The question of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its resolution is crucial for the overall success of efforts to resolve the conflict.

(Miller, 2013) reflects critically on simulations building on the authors' experience simulating the Palestinian-Israeli-American Camp David negotiations of 2000, they argue that simulations are useful pedagogical tools that encourage creative-but not critical-thinking and constructivist learning. However, they can also have the deleterious effect of reproducing unequal power relations in the classroom.

(Haniyah, 2001) tried to present the details of Camp David from a Palestinian perspective, he presented what was not told by others as he relied only on the Palestinian narrative to prove that judgments and blames on the Palestinian side were not objective.

(Malley R. A., 2001) speak about the Myth of Camp David, while (Lewin, 2016) presents an analysis of the failure of the Camp David summit that enables us to spotlight some of the deep-seated essential problems of war and peace in the Middle East. An inquiry into the substance of the summit reveals how the conflict is based on the major final issues.

(Finkelstein, 2007) reflects on Dennis Ross's book on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process from 1993 to 2000, and focuses on the Camp David summit. In particular, the article demonstrates that, judged from the perspective of Palestinians' and Israelis' respective rights under international law, all the concessions at Camp David came from the Palestinian side, none from the Israeli side.

(Swisher, 2005) shows the truth about camp david and shatters the widely known myth, he details the tragic inner workings of the Clinton Administration's negotiating mayhem, their eleventh hour blunders and miscalculations, and their concluding decision to end the Oslo process with blame and disengagement.

This paper adds value to the previous books as it is the first to link the theory of Coercive Diplomacy into the practice of political negotiations. This study is unique with the sense of going back to the details of what had happened during Camp David II and by reflecting on how those talks had influenced the current reality of the region.

Theoretical Framework

Mediation and Coercive Diplomacy

To undertake the analysis of the efforts intended to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one must first review the strategies and methods that can lead to unexpected consequences instead of bringing about a resolution. Mediation is experiencing phenomenal growth as a dispute resolution mechanism. As the mediator interacts with the parties in order to help them recognise that their problem is not a struggle between the "Good" or "Right" and the "Bad" or "Wrong", the mediator is expected to lead the dispute resolution process through developing understanding among the disputed parties (Macfarlane, 1997, p. 303). A transformative role is to be played by the mediator in helping the parties contemplate the possibility of a solution neither has thought of.

President George Bush has pointed out that the American goals through mediation should be either to establish a party autonomy; here the process aims to strengthen the parties' capacity for resolving their own problems or to develop their own agreement without depending on external professionals (Folger, Baruch, & Bush, 1994, pp. 229-249). Unlike Bush, Bill Clinton believed the mediator should advance his own proposals and interpret as well as transmit each party's proposals to the other (Merrills, 1998, p. 27).

Coercive diplomacy is only one of several alternative tools that states can employ in seeking to restrain or resolve international conflicts. However, The American-Israeli use of coercive diplomacy did not succeed in reaching a final agreement regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Placing the American-Israeli policies in dealing with the

Palestinians within a systematic theoretical framework is very important since coercive diplomacy has been the most desirable American/Israeli foreign policy tool used with the Palestinians for a period of time. Coercive diplomacy as a strategy is viable only when a special set of conditions is present in the situation. However, even when these “favouring” conditions are present, policy makers might encounter difficult problems. Arafat’s advice to have a pre-negotiating session before the Camp David summit was important to ensure such conditions, the American positions were only conditioned by serving the Israeli interests alone, (Hanyeh, 2000) .

There is a need to develop the theory of coercive diplomacy. Relating theory to action, it will be argued that applying coercion to negotiation is of a crucial importance; moreover, coercive diplomacy is active out of the negotiating framework; this mechanism is active in negotiations and as a foreign policy option.

Coercive diplomacy presents a demonstrative manner in controlled increments to induce the opponent to revise calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict (Hanyeh, 2000, p. 18). This is part of a carrot and stick approach, this is a political-diplomatic strategy not a military one for resolving or reconciling a conflict of interests with the opponent.

Thomas Schelling, in his work of 1966, Arms and Influence (Schelling, 1966), talked about “diplomacy of violence,” but Richard Goodwin, a former policy adviser in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, argued negatively. Goodwin claims that the systematic theory is impossible because in every situation the decision maker acts without knowing all relevant facts and with uncertainty as to how other political actors perceive them. Alexander, Hall, and Simons writing in 1971, (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971) disagree with Goodwin whom they think misunderstood the nature of the “systematic theory” by believing that it seeks to provide decision makers with detailed and confident prescriptions for actions that may arise.

Critical variables are very influencing when coercion takes place; (Acheson, 1958) advanced a theory of “the missing component,” arguing that problems will be solved if policy makers discover the “missing component.” The art of finding the missing component lies in mastering knowledge of all potential elements in a particular situation and determines whether adding new increments would make a critical difference. Applying Acheson’s theory to the use of coercion is of a crucial importance, relying on a “rich” theory that tries to combine a number of variables is better than a simple theory. Policy makers must go beyond available theory in order to diagnose and deal with the specific case at hand.

Considering coercive diplomacy is a risky decision; judgements are made in the face of multiple uncertainties, inadequate knowledge and under the pressure of the situation. Therefore, coercive diplomacy should be flexible following the national interests of the coercing power. (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 15) Coercive diplomacy has a number of similar variants because this strategy focuses on affecting the enemy’s will rather than negating his abilities. This strategy does not rely on the quick use of force to achieve political objectives; rather, it resorts to threats, and it is employed on a limited, selective manner.

The strategy of coercive diplomacy calls for using just enough force to demonstrate resolution to protect well-defined interests and to show credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary. Coercive diplomacy, therefore, has a signalling, bargaining, and negotiating character that is built into the conceptualization and conduct of military operations. For several reasons, states prefer to employ coercion rather than military force for achieving resolutions of conflict with other states. The coercive strategy offers the possibility of achieving one’s goals economically with little bloodshed, fewer psychological and political costs, and less risk of escalation (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 19). This is to be illustrated in the context of Clinton’s proposals at Camp David 2000.

This strategy however is viable only under certain conditions and is quite difficult to implement successfully; it is highly context dependent, and many risks and unexpected consequences may erupt. The theory of coercive diplomacy is not hard to understand; however, it must be defined explicitly. Unfortunately, the theory has been oversimplified in recent times; it was not articulated systematically, but was deemed important to statecraft and diplomatic theories. (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 21) Moreover, coercive diplomacy as part of the negotiating process did not

attract the major authors. In the modern era, attempts to theorize coercion took an abstract character, which focused on game theory and bargaining. Authors linked bargaining to coercion relying on historical experiences, rather than using coercion as a material for further developments of the theory. As a result, modern theorists had to rediscover many things that were known to policy makers in an earlier era (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 22).

In this study, coercive diplomacy will be linked to the Camp David negotiations that will enable us to identify the key variables of the theory and to examine how it influenced the status quo. The distinction between theory and practice is very important for evaluating the uses and limitations of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. In the case study, lessons should be drawn from this distinction. Here, the scope will focus on stating the theory of coercive diplomacy in richer detail, providing the analytical framework with which the case shall be approached in the next section

Feasibility of Coercive Diplomacy

Two of the critical variables that are required to successfully coerce an opponent are stated by George et.al. (1971) as follows: What is demanded of the opponent? And How strongly disinclined the opponent is to comply with the demands? In other words, the opponent's sense of urgency to comply. These two variables are not independent; the strength of the opponent's motivation not to comply is highly dependent on what is demanded from him. Alexander George in his study of forceful persuasion (1991) adds the following variables: Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for non-compliance, and Whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer inducements. According to George, two types of demand can be made, one might be asked to *stop* what he is doing or *undo* what he has been doing (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 22). Mentioning the importance of distinguishing between the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy; the first type asks less than the second type (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 23), demanding an "undo" to whatever was accomplished is more difficult than demanding a termination to what is planned to be accomplished.

For example, asking to give up a right that had been recognized by the United Nations is harder than demanding a stop of the construction of the separation wall or demanding a freeze of settlements activity. This distinction has been found useful in our case study. The first type of demands is similar to deterrence, being the matter of persuading the opponent not to do something he has not finished. Perhaps as much an example of this coercive diplomacy that is close to deterrence, is the American-Israeli threats imposed on Arafat if he considers a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.

Alexander George refers to coercive diplomacy as a defensive strategy that attempts to persuade an opponent to stop or undo an aggressive action; this strategy involves the threat of force or a limited use of force as a means of restoring peace in a diplomatic crisis. The hope is that these measures will lead to a diplomatic solution that will save lives in the long run by avoiding a much greater use of force later. (George, 1997) In contrast to the defensive use, coercive diplomacy may be employed offensively to get the opponent to do something he has not done and does not want to do-like giving up a territory- in order to avoid the threatened sanctions; this is called "diplomatic blackmail." (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 24) George distinguishes between coercive diplomacy and blackmail-the use of threats to persuade an opponent to give up something without resistance- and deterrence-the use of threats to dissuade an opponent from taking an action not yet initiated. (George, 1997, p. 5)

Thomas Schelling has introduced the term "compellance" to encompass both coercive diplomacy and blackmail (George, 1997, p. 5). But it is preferable to emphasize a more flexible diplomacy that can employ non-coercive persuasion as well as coercive threats.

The Carrot and Stick Approach

The feasibility of this strategy in any case may depend on whether one relies solely on negative sanctions or whether one combines threats with inducements to comply with what is demanded of him. This point is of considerable

practical and theoretical significance that was strongly illustrated in the Camp David 2000 talks.

The version that relies exclusively on threats makes no provision for the use of the carrot as well as the stick. One offers an opponent only face-saving gestures on peripheral matters. (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 25) This theory overlooks the possibility that coercive diplomacy in any given situation may be facilitated by genuine concessions to an opponent as part of a “quid pro quo” that secures one’s demands. (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 25).

Let us take the Distributive bargaining style, it is a fixed sum game, one party gains at the expense of the other. Diana Tribe calls it the cooperative approach, when each party making concessions in the anticipation that the opponent will reciprocate, the parties will then move to compromise solutions. (Tribe, 1993, p. 5) Josh Nash also has developed an axiomatic model of bargaining for the cooperative model. (Alvin, 1985, p. 1) However let us mention the Productivity bargaining style, when a group expects a reward for their increased contributions, a win-win outcome may not be achieved and instead there might be a lose-lose result.

Without the combination of the opportunity and the political will of the leaders backed up with the facilitation of the mediators, it is hard to view any possibility for peace. *You can’t do it without the leaders and you cannot do it with the leaders and without the negotiators.* (Sher, 2004) Gilead Sher insists that negotiators can work and agree on almost everything, but when it comes to decision making, the leaders take responsibility. Sometimes deals are made secretly between leaders, who then try to persuade their own sides to accept them. The problem is getting the opponents to agree, too many concessions to the other side can destabilize the position of the leader and even lead to their death (Rees & Porter, 2001, pp. 350-351); the Palestinian president, Arafat¹ did not want to be the successor of a number of Arabs who have been assassinated for their calls for peace, naming Saïid Hamami and Mahmoud Hamshari. Others have been killed because of their efforts in bringing about peace like: the Israeli Prime Yitzhak Rabin,² who was assassinated by an Israeli fundamentalist after signing the Oslo agreement back in 1995. And Count Folke Bernadotte, who was appointed by the United Nations as a mediator in Palestine, he was assassinated by a Zionist movement in Jerusalem, after his first report.

Coercive diplomacy, therefore, needs to be distinguished from pure coercion; it includes bargaining, negotiating, and compromises as well as coercive threats. What the stick cannot achieve can be achieved by combining a carrot with the stick; you threaten and give the opponent a substantial quid pro quo. However, the target of coercive diplomacy may not be so cooperative in helping to formulate the carrot that will contribute to an acceptable quid pro quo. (Rees & Porter, 2001, p. 243) It becomes harder for the stronger party to formulate a combined carrot and stick because of the opponent’s reluctance to do what is demanded of him, Americans and Israelis did not pay enough attention to this point; they did not expect the Palestinians to say no. The opponent’s motivation to resist what is demanded of him must be calculated by the defending power.

The chances that coercive diplomacy will be successful according to the abstract theory will be greater if the objective selected reflects only the most important interests of the coercing power. This is more likely to create an asymmetry of motivation favouring the coercing power (Rees & Porter, 2001, p. 26). This explains how the wide scope of the Israeli interests affected their strategies negatively by pursuing ambitious objectives which imbalanced their own motivation that came at the expense of Palestinian rights.

The central task of coercive diplomacy is the attempt to create an understanding of how could a threat persuade an opponent to comply with demands? The abstract theory is not a textbook of “how-to-do-it” prescriptions. (George, 1997, p. 14) How effective coercive diplomacy can be in a particular case can never be fully predicted because this requires a number of additional contextual variables that the abstract theory does not take into account.

It is essential to draw a distinction between the weaker and the stronger parties in the theory of coercive diplomacy.

¹ (Yasser Arafat, president (from 1996) of the Palestinian Authority, chairman (from 1969) of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO))

² (Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister 1992-95; signed Oslo accords with the PLO)

We need to distinguish between the basic variants of coercive diplomacy:

1. The Try and See approach-the weak variant.
2. The Classic Ultimatum approach, the strong variant.

The Try and See approach takes one-step at a time; a clear demand is conveyed but it postpones the decision to take additional action until it becomes clear whether the steps already taken will have a sufficient coercive impact on the opponent. When employing the Try and See approach, you do not create a sense of urgency nor a time limit for compliance with the demands. In contrast, the Classic Ultimatum variant of the strategy, at the same time the defending power takes its initial actions it communicates to the opponent that more damaging steps will follow if he does not comply with the demands, in addition to a time limit, or a sense of urgency accompanied with a credible threat of punishment. (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 27) George has added to the 1971 study the distinction between the theory and the generic knowledge; as a result, additional variants of the theory emerged. When a time limit is not explicitly set but a sense of urgency is conveyed, we turn to the third variant of the theory, which is the "Tacit Ultimatum." There, remains the last variant "Gradual turning of the screw," that differs from the Try and See approach in that a threat to step up pressure is conveyed incrementally. This variant differs from the Ultimatum in that it lacks a sense of time urgency and relies on a threat of gradual increase. So far, distinction among four different forms of the strategy of coercive diplomacy has been covered; 1. the ultimatum, 2. the tacit ultimatum, 3. the try-and-see, and 4. the gradual turning of the screw variants. It is important to mention that the coercing power may shift from one variant to another. (George, 1997, pp. 7-9) From a formalistic standpoint, the Ultimatum is a stronger variant than other approaches. However, the coercive impact of any form of the strategy and whether it will be effective depends on many factors; coercive persuasion depends not only on whether the defender includes all three components of a classical ultimatum in its verbal message to the opponent. (Alexander, Hall, & William, 1971, p. 30) The structure of the situation as it develops and the sense of urgency that might unfold must be taken into account.

Case Study

Camp David 2000: Analysis and Findings

Researching on Camp David, no proposal was presented to the Palestinian delegation by the American mediators that was not presented to the Israelis first. In fact, this is not new; Adlai Stevens has raised this issue earlier: *Practically, no decision concerning Israel can be taken, or even discussed, at executive level, without the immediate knowledge of the Israeli government.* (Roger, 1997, p. P 176) Arafat's words illustrate how the honest broker that the Palestinians expected to find never showed up, *Excuse me, those are not American ideas. They are Israeli ideas I received unofficially from the Israelis hours before I received them from you.* (Saeb)

The time factor played a crucial role; most of the Israeli delegates were more concerned about opinion polls, press, articles plus the leader's statements than to end the conflict; protecting their seats in the Knesset was all that mattered. The Americans were very nervous wanting to reach an agreement before Clinton's administration leaves office, the changing governments on both the American and the Israeli administrations played a great role; *I am sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands of people who are expecting the success of Zionism. I do not have thousands of Arabs among my electors.* (Garoudy, 1997, p. 165) Quoting President Truman, it is obvious how he and his successors did the same for electoral reasons by adopting policies congenial to the Israeli government's policies.

The Camp David summit has been perceived as a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The Israeli perspective on Camp David was that Barak "broke every imaginable taboo" (Reinhart, 2002, p. 21) and offered concessions that no Israeli prime minister offered before or could in the future. According to this version of the story, Barak offered to return Gaza and 90% of the West Bank to the Palestinians. All he asked for in return was the annexation of 10% of the land. Regarding the most sensitive issue of Jerusalem, he agreed to divide the city and recognize part of it as the capital of the future Palestinian state. According to this version, the Palestinian negotiators rejected the generous proposals, and failed to come up with a counterproposal. The second version of the story is

illustrated in Robert Malley's words, published in the New York Times: (Malley)

Many have come to believe that the Palestinians' rejection of the Camp David ideas exposed an underlying rejection of Israel's right to exist. But consider the facts: the Palestinian state based on the June 4, 1967, borders living alongside Israel. They accepted the notion of Israeli annexation of West Bank territory to accommodate settlement blocs. They accepted the principle of Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem-neighbourhoods that were not part of Israel before the Six-Day War in 1967. and , while, they insisted on recognition of the refugees' right of return , they agreed it should be implemented in a manner that protected Israel's demographic and security interests by limiting the number of returnees. No other Arab party that has negotiated with Israel-not Anwar al Saddat's Egypt nor king Hussein's Jordan, let alone Hafez al Assad's Syria- ever came close to even considering such compromises. (Reinhart, 2002, pp. 22-23)

Claims about Barak's offer came with no documentation to substantiate them, no Israeli paper existed; the ideas put forward in Camp David were never stated in writing, but were orally conveyed. They were presented as American concepts, not Israeli ones. On one hand, Israelis argue that the Palestinians went to the summit without a proposal and that they were not ready for such a compromise. Recently, Clinton in his book said: Barak did all the giving and Arafat made no response in kind. (Clinton, 2004, p. 913) A shared American-Israeli blame was imposed on Arafat for the breakdown of the peace talks, (Dershowitz, 2003, p. 118) they believe Arafat was waiting for the paper to reach his hands and then react with a rejection. Camp David, as Sher describes, was designed to end the occupation and, hoped to "end the conflict" and from an Israeli perspective, "Palestinians were seeking a historic justice." On the other hand, in the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians recognised Israeli sovereignty over 78% of historic Palestine (According to the Palestinian Negotiating Affairs Department, 23% more than what Israel was granted pursuant to the 1947 UN partition plan.) On the assumption that Palestinians would be able to exercise sovereignty over the remaining 22%. This compromise was forgotten at Camp David and Palestinians were asked to "compromise the compromise." Had the Palestinians signed such a declaration, they would have lost all legal standing for future claims based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Barak, who said in his campaign that Palestinians had a right to their own state, (Reporters Without Borders, 2002, pp. 7-8) wanted to annex 80% of the settlements to Israel, which is 10% of the occupied territories.

Palestinians accepted the idea of "land swap" but proposed that such land swap must be based on a one-to-one ratio, with land of equal value and in areas adjacent to the border with Palestine and in the same vicinity as the lands to be annexed to Israel.

During the war of 1948, 730,000 people, half of the Palestinian population, were driven off their homeland by the Israelis. It is obvious that ending the conflict requires resolving the issue of the Palestinian refugees where as in Camp David the Israelis rid themselves of any responsibility for this dilemma! Talking to Abu Ala', it is found that Barak told Peres that he went to the summit "to unmask Arafat," the Prime Minister went to the summit aiming to prove that Arafat is not a man of peace and that a Palestinian partner does not exist, rather than try to conclude a final deal.

Some argue that what the Palestinians were offered regarding Jerusalem is a chance that they will regret forever. In fact, no full sovereignty was given to the Palestinians in their capital. All they were given was "autonomous control" over parts in east Jerusalem. Administrative authority in the Arab neighbourhoods was what the Israelis proposed. Religious sensitivities attracted attention at Camp David; giving Israel authority under the Aqsa Mosque is something that Palestinians can never give up because Israelis claim that there is an ancient tunnel running under the Temple Mount; if opened, the tunnel would allow direct movement from the western wall to one of the entrances to the Dome of the Rock Mosque in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem. (Quandt, 2001, p. 343)

Members of the Palestinian delegation claim that the cake was an Israeli homemade; no regional interests were taken into consideration, and no international resolutions were remembered. With assertiveness, Arafat said: Barak is responsible for the failure. (Interview with President Arafat, Ramallah, January 2004) Moreover, the Israeli team was very worried about the political situation, and the party's roles back home. The Palestinian negotiating affairs

department claims that a “re-packaging” of military occupation rather than its end was proposed. Negotiations between the PA and Israel were disturbed by conceptual gaps and the absence of a strategy for negotiations on the part of the Palestinians. Gilead Sher described the Palestinian approach as being “based on emotions of justice and grievance.” (Naseer, 2003) A dilemma between the moralistic and the realpolitik emerges in these negotiations; where the Israelis feel that negotiations must end in compromises but fail to acknowledge that the Palestinians had already made their compromises. On the other hand, the Palestinians needed more readiness and steadiness; their team was not fully prepared; their views were not united; moreover, as Abu Mazen and Erakat confirmed ((Interview with Abu Mazen, former Palestinian Prime Minister, Ramallah, 14th august 2004)), most of the negotiators were not able to distinguish the Wailing Wall that runs for 58 meters from the Western wall that runs for 485 meters.

In the words of the Israeli political and military analyst Ze'ev Schiff, writing in the Hebrew daily *Ha'aretz*:

What is the length of the Western Wall? Is it confined to the wall facing the space traditionally used by Jews for [prayer](#), which is only 58 meters, or does it include the entire western retaining wall of the Temple Mount? The Palestinians demand that any diplomatic settlement adhere to the shorter length, known as "the Wailing Wall." Israel insists on "the Western Wall"...whose length is 485 meters.³

This could have caused them serious problems if the Palestinian team was not backed up by some negotiators and academics who were well briefed and deeply researched all topics regarding a final deal.

A question that might come to people's minds; what benefits could have been gained if there was a signing? The proposal divided the Palestinian territory into four separate cantons surrounded by Israel, the northern West Bank, the central West Bank, the southern West Bank, and Gaza. Moving from one area to another would require crossing Israeli sovereign territory. With naiveté Barak stated: “Palestinian territorial continuity would have been assured by a tunnel or a bridge.” (Philo & Berry, 2004, p. 83) Not only would those restrictions apply to movement of people, but also to the movement of goods. The Palestinian economy would be subjected to Israeli control.

Jeff Halper, a professor at Ben Gurion University argues that the focus on whether the Palestinian were offered 81% or 91% is misplaced because even if Israel agreed to hand back 96 percent, it would still possess a “Matrix of Control” which would completely undermine Palestinians' sovereignty. (Quandt, 2001, p. 86) Even if Arafat agreed, the agreement would not have been held because of the by-pass roads crossing the West Bank linking settlements which would also require a permanent Israeli military presence across the Palestinian enclaves state that was later presented by Trump on the 28th January 2020.

Both Israelis and Americans accused the Palestinians several times of not taking initiative, and for not presenting a comprehensive permanent settlement proposal of their response to Barak's proposal. The American impatience attitude is not new; on the contrary, it was obvious when they felt that the Palestinians would not make decisions at Oslo back in 1993. (Corbin, 1994, p. 144) However, the Palestinians responded to this accusation by saying that they had come with clear guidelines. Their concept for the resolution of the key permanent status issues was embodied in the UN resolutions 242 and 338, which were accepted by both sides at the Madrid summit in 1991 and later in the Oslo accords of 1993.

It is vital to mention that prior to negotiations on permanent issues; Prime Minister Barak publicly and repeatedly threatened the Palestinians. Coercive diplomacy was highly considered among the Israeli strategies in dealing with the Palestinians; Barak clarified that his offer would be Israel's best and final offer, and if not accepted Israel would seriously consider “unilateral separation” to impose a settlement rather than negotiate one.

It is argued that Palestinians do not want to live in peace with the other side and the violence, which erupted after Camp David, proves it. In fact, the Palestinians had recognized Israel's right to exist since 1988; nevertheless, Israel has yet to explicitly and formally recognize Palestine's right to exist. Palestinians do indeed wish to live in peace with

³ (The Jewish Virtual Library, available online at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/wallname.html>)

Israel but this peace must be a fair peace. After all, Barak gave nothing new to the Palestinian at Camp David, as Clinton's words demonstrate this fact: I assured the people of Israel that he had done nothing to compromise their security and that they should be proud of him. (Quandt, 2001, p. 916)

The Camp David non-success in reaching an agreement was followed by months of secret negotiations between Palestinian and Israeli officials. On 28th September 2000, Ariel Sharon and 2000 armed police visited Islam's third holiest site, Al-Haram Al-Sharif.

Palestinians considered this visit to the Temple Mount as a provocative gesture and a statement of sovereignty; this laid the foundations for the second Intifada. Violence broke out in Jerusalem then spread to all occupied territories. By 2002, all Palestinian towns and cities were the target of extensive Israeli military operations using rubber bullets and tear gas (in theory), in fact, involving armoured ground forces, infantry, and the air force. (Reporters Without Borders, 2002)

Conclusion

Considering the deteriorated situation on the ground especially since the arrival of Trump to the White House and his imposed facts, coupled with the recent Covid-19 implications and the continuous colonial settlement project with the most recent annexation plans announced by Netanyahu; the political and economic situation introduced a double lockdown of occupation and Corona on the Palestinians, and the exercise of coercive diplomacy in the region shattered the dreams of reaching an agreed compromise.

In answering the questions introduced in the introduction, to answer the main question of:

- Was Coercive Diplomacy conducted in the mediation process between Israel and Palestine at the time of the Camp David II?

The paper found that Coercive Diplomacy was conducted in the peace process between Israel and Palestine at the time of the Camp David talks; moreover, coercive diplomacy had replaced Mediation as a tool of conflict resolution. The case study illustrated how the ultimatums proposed in July 2000 were later, and more specifically under the Trump's administration translated to imposed facts on the ground which had severely influenced the status quo of the final agreement issues (Jerusalem, borders, security, water, prisoners and refugees).

Studying the case of Camp David, it is evident that a time limit, sense of urgency, credible punishment, and more damaging steps were to be imposed on the Palestinians if they did not comply with the demands, in other words, the strongest ultimatum was used with the Palestinians. Coercive diplomacy was the strategy employed by policy makers in hope of securing a peaceful resolution for a serious dispute. Any theory is somehow general and abstract because coercive diplomacy is highly context dependent. This study, given its specific scope, will not say a lot about the feasibility of the strategy, nor will it clarify what it will take in a particular situation on the part of the enforcing party to persuade the opponent to cease or undo his encroachment. Nonetheless, this study endeavours to clarify a number of difficulties and uncertainties a strategy might encounter in concrete situations.

- What is Coercive Diplomacy?

To answer this question, the paper had introduced a theoretical framework on the theory of coercive diplomacy, its definitions, its aspects and conditions were all discussed in detail. The paper succeeded in linking the theory of coercive diplomacy to negotiations, usually the theory is linked to economic sanctions, however this paper presented the theory of coercive diplomacy in the context of negotiations and this has led to answering the third question:

- Was Coercive Diplomacy practiced in Camp David 2000?

It is found that the American-Israeli ad hoc improvised conduct of the conflict resolution constitutes an example of a general strategy, which is called coercive diplomacy. This is by no means to say that coercive diplomacy was a well-defined strategy at the time it was used, it was not. In this study, the unexpected consequences that this strategy might encounter were clarified with the recent imposed facts on the ground. It will be left to the reader to draw the gaps between the real task of an honest mediator and the American mediating techniques adopted in dealing with the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The paper presented the Palestinian narrative on those talks. The paper had touched upon many books that put the blame of the non-success of Camp David at the Palestinians for not accepting what was called a generous offer, the paper discussed what was proposed during July 2000 verbally and explained how the proposed details on Jerusalem, on sovereignty can never be accepted by any Palestinian. The Palestinians have already given up 78% of historic Palestine, recognised the state of Israel, while the Israelis didn't recognize the right of the Palestinians to live in a sovereign state, and above all this, the American proposal of Camp David camp about to serve the Israeli interests in confiscating more Palestinian land and deprive the Palestinians from their inalienable rights that are protected by the international law and UN resolutions.

- What was offered at Camp David?

This question had been answered under the section of the case study of Camp David II, through the details of the proposal that was presented at Camp David on issues related to the final status issues; Jerusalem, security, borders and refugees, the paper shed light on details of the proposal like the dilemma of the western Vs Wailing wall, the quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem, the sovereignty under the Aqsa mosque, the land swaps and the rights of each party.

- To what extent did the Americans and Israelis coerce the Palestinians?

The carrot and stick approach gives negotiation and bargaining a dimension of coercive diplomacy; the carrot in such a strategy can be any of a variety of things the target of coercion values. The process of negotiating is so complex that there neither is nor can be one theory that embraces all aspects of negotiations.

- How is the Trump's plan influenced by Camp David?

Bill Clinton had bluntly coerced Arafat by telling him that the United States would no longer help the Palestinians in any way if he doesn't sign the agreement, he warned him that American aid to the Palestinians will be cut, that the US would no longer support the Palestinian rights and those threats were literally translated in Trump's imposed facts on the ground naming his recognition of Jerusalem as capital for Israel, declining from signing the waiver, closing down the PLO representation office in Washington, cutting aid to Palestinian hospitals and interrupting USAID projects, ridding the US any responsibility for UNRWA and weakening the institution by cutting American aid. So what Clinton had warned was all translated into action under the administration of Trump in the context of his deal of the century.

- Why did the Peace Process fall apart?

The non-success of reaching an agreement at Camp David came as a result of the coercive American-Israeli diplomacy imposed on the Palestinians. It is true that no agreement came about and no deal was closed at Camp David, but what we had witnessed since 2000, -and twenty years later- during the Trump's administration since his declaration of Jerusalem as capital for Israel on the 6th December 2017, coupled with the shut down of the PLO office in Washington, the cut of aid to Palestinians, the halt of support to UNRWA, the removal of the term occupied on Golan heights and territories occupied in 1967, and the Peace to Prosperity Peace Plan are all examples of the ultimatum coercive diplomacy that is based on what was said at Camp David. The summit was not a success. Then, a visit by Ariel Sharon, the new Likud party leader, to Alaqsa mosque in Jerusalem to emphasize Israeli sovereignty over the city sparked Palestinian protests and the worst violence in the region in decades. Sharon's electoral victory in February 2001 signalled a more cautious Israeli approach to the peace process. Israel has been expanding its never identified borders through building blocks of settlements; on the other hand, in the absence of peace, Israel could never achieve the security it is calling for.

Clinton had announced that the summit ended without an agreement; therefore, despite the use of the term "failure," we find no failure at those talks, at least the core issues had finally been discussed at the highest level. Parties agreed that some progress had been made on the extremely difficult issues of Jerusalem, settlement, borders, refugees, prisoners and security. The important fact about this summit was that it opened the final status files but the real progress was made in the secret negotiations that took place in Jerusalem after the summit, followed by the recognised Clinton parameters, and then the most important progress regarding the final status issues was reached in Taba. If the

summit was perceived as a negotiating summit rather than a decision making one, Camp David could have achieved a lot more than it did.

Finally, it is urgent to learn the lessons from recent history, such lessons are drawn from plausible objective interpretation of this case study and as Jacob Burckhardt once said: "*the true use of history is not to make men more clever for the next time but to make them wiser forever.*" (The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, P. 251)

Recommendations

Studying the theory of coercive diplomacy and Camp David talks, this paper recommends that the parties not only need trust building mechanisms and enthusiasm but also an objective win/win interest based mediation approach that should facilitate the way to reaching a compromise driven by a non-zero sum game.

The study recommends that this conflict requires a consortium collective effort of mediators to guarantee any success or further reaching any win/win situation. The US alone cant be an honest broker which can deliver beyond serving the interests of Israel at the expense of Palestinian rights.

Mediation is ineffective in situations where any solution would require one side to abandon its main objectives. The gulf between the Palestinian-Israeli respective positions is simply not too wide to be bridged but mediation is subject to the same limitations as other means of dispute settlement; mediation can be effective as the parties wish it to be. Although success will always be incomplete and failure sometimes inevitable, the mediator's job is to do his best for the parties, and trust that they will reciprocate. The paper recommends more serious engagement from mediating parties which will hold the primary parties to the conflict accountable if they don't respect their obligations and deadlines.

In order to employ a successful coercive diplomacy one must find a combination of carrot and stick. In the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, reliance was largely put on the stick. Moreover, the timing of negotiating is a crucial factor in the conduct of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. The controlling of time in negotiations can highly influence the effectiveness; given two weeks at Camp David to end the historic Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not convenient. The study recommends a well-timed offer of mediation to be presented rather than an open negotiating session.

The study recommends greater independence of American decision making; they were not tough enough with Israelis regarding settlement activity. Nevertheless, it was found that the American administration is not the best broker for the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, for the reason that America is considered to be the number one ally for Israel; the Associated Press reported, "In a major policy shift, the US on Friday told the Security Council that it will only consider Middle East resolutions that explicitly condemn Palestinian terrorism and call on both sides to pursue a political settlement." (Naseer, 2003, p. 203) (The Associated Press on July 26th 2002)

Speaking to a number of Palestinian officials who participated in Camp David, it was obvious that the Palestinian team was fragmented and went with a number of conflicted views; as every one of them seeks a heroic history,⁴ Palestinians need to formulate a united vision and they need to reflect more readiness for the termination of the conflict.

A permanent status agreement should not be a document that declares general political principles. Rather, it must be a comprehensive instrument that spells out the details, modalities, maps and timetables of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Lastly, the role played by the international community must be stronger. The Permanent Status Agreement must be backed by clear, effective international implementation guarantees in order to be effective, an international consortium needs to be formed to mediate the final status negotiations.

⁴ Interviewing a number of Palestinian negotiators, most of them tried to illustrate how the big role was (The Associated Press on July 26th 2002)played by him; Abu ALA' believes his efforts were behind the summit; meanwhile, Abu Mazen believes he was the one who brought this summit to reality. Both of them said that they were the ones who rejected the proposal and not Arafat

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القسرية الدبلوماسية: كامب ديفيد 2000

دلال عريقات *

ملخص

استضاف شهر تموز 2000 أهم محادثات في كامب ديفيد؛ حيث عرضت قضايا الوضع النهائي على طاولة المفاوضات. ومع ذلك، لم تُوقع أي صفقة. منذ ذلك الحين تصاعد العنف وعدم الاستقرار في المنطقة، وبعد وصول الرئيس دونالد ترامب إلى البيت الأبيض شهدت عملية السلام الفلسطينية/الإسرائيلية تحولاً دراماتيكياً بسبب القرارات التي اتخذتها الإدارة بشأن قضايا الوضع النهائي؛ وعلى نحو أكثر تحديداً القدس واللجئين، التي جرى الانتهاء منها مع ما يسمى بخطة ترامب للسلام من أجل الازدهار. وعليه، تسلط هذه الورقة الضوء على نظرية الدبلوماسية القسرية وتطبيقها في المفاوضات الفلسطينية/الإسرائيلية، مع الأخذ بمحادثات كامب ديفيد 2000 كدراسة حالة، ثم دراسة ما قُدم في تلك المحادثات فيما يتعلق بما يُنفذ الآن من قبل الولايات المتحدة الحالية؛ الإدارة التي تجرأت على ترجمة التهديدات السابقة إلى واقع. ومن خلال مراجعة الأدبيات السابقة والاعتماد على عدد من الكتب وإجراء مقابلات مع مفاوضين بارزين من الأطراف الأمريكية والفلسطينية والإسرائيلية الذين شاركوا في محادثات السلام هذه، تروي الدراسة القصة الحقيقية لكامب ديفيد، توضح الدبلوماسية القسرية في الممارسة، كما توضح كيف تجاوز وسطاء الطرف الثالث حدودهم بقوة من خلال التخلي عن دورهم كوسطاء وارتداء قبعات المتدخلين، توضح الورقة أيضاً كيف نظر ترتيب ترامب إلى حد ما في ما تمت مناقشته في كامب ديفيد.

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