China’s Rise in Current International Order:

Levels and Dilemmas

Islam Ayyadi

Researcher in International Relations, Arabic and Media Department, Arab American University-Palestine

Islam.aiadi@aauj.edu

Abstract

This study addresses China's rise, which has enhanced its international standing and its rapid progress to become one of the most important countries that are sought for investment by the world’s countries. In addition, this rise has not only enabled China to strengthen its standing, presence and influence on many countries around the world, especially the United States of America, which is the first recipient of the Chinese investments abroad, but this rise has also led to China’s transformation and the sustainability of its economic growth, which has become one of the main icons of the stability in the global economy, and its recovery from the continuous economic recession since the global crisis in 2008. The main aim of this study is to identify the levels of China’s rise and the problems being faced in the World of today. According to this study, China has not reached nor is expected to reach the level to be competitive to the US in the short run, but it may reach the position of a great economic world power.

Keywords: China’s Rise, China, United States of America, International Order, International Pole, Dilemma.
Introduction

China's rapid rise in many international power entities has raised many expectations that China will become an international power in the near future and possibly an international leader in no later than the end of this century. Some have even assumed that with the rise of the Chinese power, and the failure of the American leadership in the world order, or at least its fragility, the world is already witnessing the harbingers of a multipolarism era, not only in the economic sphere, but also in the political, military and intellectual spheres.

The great reformation revolution in China, which began in 1978, led to China to become a major economic power, with an annual growth rate of more than 10 percent for three decades and the second largest economic power in the world after the United States. Additionally, the gap between the US and its Chinese counterpart has fallen sharply. That is, after US GDP was four to five times higher than that of China in the late 20th century, now the US GDP is only the double. Further, the Chinese currency has become a recognized currency in the IMF's adopted currency series since 2016. China has also developed its military capabilities. For instance, China's military budget in 2017 was 1.04 trillion (US$151 billion), which was the second after the United States although the US defense budget is three times higher than that of China. It is also the world's most populous, cohesive and homogenous nation supported by the Confucian Culture with the second largest economy in the world ($11,795.297 trillion) after USA ($19,417.144 trillion) (International Monetary Fund World Economic, 2017). More importantly, the level of education is increasing day by day, and the technological level is proceeding at a high developmental pace. Politically, China has a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, which is attributed to the elements of geography- extended in areas starting from the Korean Peninsula, through Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Iran and Syria, to touch the waters of the Gulf, and history that have played an influential role in addition to its constant aspiration to the resources of Africa, and its large investments there.

Overall, it can be said that by both solid and soft power, China has become the second largest force in the world after the United States, since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century due to China's economy, culture, heritage and military strength that have been taken into consideration from all the states of the world.

This study briefs China's Foreign and Domestic policies, then discusses the mechanisms and elements of the Chinese strategy, and analyzes the potential levels of the rise of China and its transformation
into an international pole. Finally, the study illustrates the obstacles of turning China into an international pole.

**Problem of the study**

The problem of the study is the extent to which China has become an international pole after its miraculous economic recovery and its technological development. Additionally, the United States is expected to fall to the second place, and China will rise to the first. The main question of the study is: How far is China becoming an international pole under the current international order? What are the levels and the obstacles of China's rise?

**Significance of the study**

- Increasing the interest in the recent argument on the transformation of China into an international pole in particular and the future of international polarization in general.
- The study is an addition to research focusing on Asian studies, especially China.
- The study tries to contribute, even if only slightly to build knowledge of the subject.
- Know the consequences and effects on the Arab world and the Palestinian cause.

**Methodology of the Study**

The methodology of this study used the descriptive and analytical approach. The study also applies the theory of traditional realism as theoretical framework. This theory emphasizes that the rise of the state is linked to expansionist tendencies that generate conflict in the most part. It seeks to secure its needs and borders from other countries and preserve its interests in various ways whether cooperative and non-cooperative.

**First: Background of China's Foreign and Domestic Policies.**

China's international behavior and its domestic agenda are closely intertwined across a wide range of policy issues.

China's decisions on foreign policy questions are derived from the five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Chinese leadership originally adopted principles in 1954 when China, with a communist government, was trying to reach out to the non-communist countries of Asia.
The five principles still serve a useful purpose. They offer an alternative to the American conception of a new kind of world order, in which the international regimes and institutions often reflect U.S. interests and values, limit the rights of sovereign states to develop and sell weapons of mass destruction, repress opposition and violate human rights, pursue mercantilist economic policies that interfere with free trade, and damage the environment.

China's alternative design for the world stresses the equal and uninfringeable sovereignty of all states large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, each to run its own system as it sees fit, whether its methods suit Western standards or not. Another Chinese term for such a system is "multipolarity." The five principles explain why America should not be able to impose its values on weaker nations. Thus the core idea behind the five principles as interpreted by China today is sovereignty – that one state has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state (Principles of China's Foreign Policy, 2009).

China's foreign policy is consistently consistent with its main objectives, with the successive leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Presidential Foundation working together to realize the dream of the great rebirth of the Chinese nation, which requires the building of a prosperous society before 2021 (the centennial of the Communist Party of China) and making China a modern, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious socialist state before 2049 (the centennial of modern China). However, this relative stability doesn't negate the pragmatic character of the Chinese policies pursued to reach these long-term goals; these policies are characterized by the evolution of their interim objectives from time to time, and the possibility of changing policy instruments, depending on the context of the implementation process (Alsalami, 2017, p.19).

In addition to the pragmatic nature of China's foreign policy-making, we also note a dialectical relationship between the objectives and tools across different stages of time. For instance, what was once a goal, such as promoting China's economic relations across the world to increase exports and promote domestic growth, became, at a later stage, an important geo-economic tool to achieve several goals of China's foreign policy to strengthen its position as a regional and even major international power.

The political system of the PRC (People's Republic of China) is primarily of Soviet-Leninist origin, and dates back to the year 1949 when the communists assumed power over China. Although considerable structural modifications have been made since China’s opening up in
the late 1970s, the system itself remained largely unchanged to the present day. That is, politics takes place within the framework of a socialist single-party state with a highly centralized power structure. Based on a dual leadership pattern, state power is exercised through the CCP on the one hand, and the state institutions on the other. The actual control over China is in the hand of the CCP, that is deeply immersed in the state apparatus both at the national and the local administrative levels. Frankly speaking, the complex interlacing between the state institutions and the CCP is what characterizes China’s political system (www.chinaweb.de, 2007).


China has a growing international standing represented by its vision of its role in the international arena, which is crucial in any attempt to explore the future of international relations to the extent that China is similar to other major international powers in influencing the input of the major international order, in building its vision of its international role. This role is characterized by highly specific cultural, developmental and societal determinants that contribute to China's differentiation and uniqueness.

China is more concerned with amending the rules of the international economic system than changing the international political structure. If China's political discourse calls for a fairer, more equitable and multi-polar international order, China will see itself as an "interest" in the structure of the international system and believes that the current international order can't be changed, nor remain the same, and that the reform of the international system should not be a solo or a collective play; it must be a symphony played differently by the people (Yamen, 2015).

Therefore, China has adopted the current building of its foreign vision and policy, and is dealing with the world on a range of modern mechanisms that have revived and renewed the political, economic and societal components that have developed over the past four decades. These mechanisms can be summarized as follows (Nu'man, 2017, p.7):

1. Chinese civilization and its influence, primarily regional impact from a cultural perspective, and global impact from the perspective of trade and economy, perhaps the clearest example of this is the land and sea silk road, are two major steps in the renaissance of China and its external relations, and its impact abroad.
2. The objectives of foreign policy and its principles, which can be summarized as follows:
First, the quest to build international economic relations on the basis of the principle of dealings and common winnings. Despite its similarity in the principle of trade and economic expansion globally with the other empires, China's style is different, especially with Western empires, whose style was based on the concept of expansion and colonialism; China's foreign policy, historically and not currently, has not witnessed such colonial goals.

Secondly, the Chinese security is linked to the traditional Chinese principle of the preservation of Chinese territory and unity without compromising any part of it, and pursuing the principle of long-term patience to restore what China considers territory that is part of its land, such as Hong Kong and Macao.

Thirdly, China has always modernized its military, whether through cooperation with other countries or self-reliance. More specifically, China had cooperated in the area of military modernization with the Soviet Union since its establishment in 1949 until the beginning of the sixties of the last century. However and due to the ideological schism, and then the dispute on the border in 1970s, when the Soviet Union refused to give China a nuclear bomb in the 1960s, China relied on its own potential and on Chinese scientists in the nuclear field. The impact of this factor has determined the orientations of China's foreign policy on the issue of the development of arms technology between China and Israel in the late 1970s.

Fourth, China's endeavors to promote the development structure to achieve a better standard of living for the Chinese people. In this regard, Xiaobang adopted the philosophy of socialism with Chinese characteristics. China embarked on its development endeavor based on the principle of separating politics from the economy. This chapter has been and continues to be the cornerstone of China's foreign policy, one of whose objectives is to secure and deepen its relations with other countries (Nu'man, 2017, p.7).

3. Building a solid basis for the external relations based on non-racial principles derived from the Chinese cultural heritage, especially the principle of earning for all. More specifically, China's reliance on the logic of the initiative to strengthen relations with the States and facilitate the solution of problems is its most important pillars for foreign policy, which focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative.

4. China's philosophy of management and political participation, where all nationalities participate in the Chinese political system, within a three-dimensional philosophy, is unique.
Regarding the political dimension, the freedom of political participation is guaranteed, provided membership in the Communist Party. As for the cultural dimension, China respects the cultures of the other fifty-five nationalities in the Chinese society. The Chinese rule is based on autonomous regions including Tibet, private management areas, such as Hong Kong, and metropolitan areas, such as Beijing. In fact, Chinese autonomy is difficult to understand for many non-specialists (Nu'man, 2017, p.8).

Third: Possible Levels of China Rise.

It is clear to us that China's policy is comprehensive in its geographical expansion and seeks to consolidate the prevailing imbalance in most of these relations for the benefit of China, such as the relations with USA. Perhaps China, through its growing attraction to its economic power, is qualified to play an international role as a great power, but to become an international pole, China must be tested at three levels: the first level is the Chinese internal affairs, and the extent of the aspirations of China to lead the global system. The second level is the United States of America and its willingness to face the Chinese competition, or its keenness to be unique in leading this system. The third level is the interactions in the international system, and the competition that may arise between China and the other emerging countries, or some major countries that may not be interested in China's leadership of the world order.

A. The First Level: the Chinese internal affairs, and the extent of the aspiration of China to lead the World Order.

According to the theory of traditional realism, the rise of the state is linked to expansionist tendencies that generate conflict in most cases, seeking to secure their needs from other countries, secure their borders, and preserve what they include in their interests in various ways, cooperative and non-cooperative. Therefore, some explain that the mismatch of this theoretical interpretation of the status of China rise so far means that the China rise will remain peaceful, has no symptoms to lead the international system, especially that the history of modern China, the period known as the "Century of Humiliation" (which has been subjected to occupation), has left the political leadership in China a desire to affirm the national pride, and the pursuit of huge achievements sufficient to erase the effects of that period, which is achieved for China, by focusing on economic development. Proponents of
the theory of realism do not see this theoretical interpretation as not applicable to the present international system (Friedberg, 2005, p.12).

Here, it must be pointed out that the form and nature of the current world order are different from the traditional form, one state leadership. Although the United States is the largest economy and the largest military power, some changes are brought about in the system, the most important of which is the growing strength of China, which put an end to the exclusive international unipolar since China is based on a number of bases, but does not match the US leadership model as it emerged in the 20th century. Internally, China, which lacks freedoms or democracy, is characterized by the United States as a nation of civilization and history. Externally, China is suffering from many border conflicts, and some parties to those conflicts are trying to ally with the United State in the face of China. (Blumenthal, 2015).

China is also focusing on strengthening its regional standing, emphasizing multilateralism in the international system. At the regional level, China is creating new areas that are believed to support its regional domination and thus support its international standing, albeit gradually, including its initiative to establish an investment bank and infrastructure, or interest in BRIX platforms and the G20. If the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) is very successful, then in five years it might lend $20 billion per year—that is to say, on a scale with the World Bank’s IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) lending. But just in steel alone, China would need $60 billion per year of extra demand to absorb excess capacity. This figure excludes excess capacity in cement, construction, and heavy machinery; the point is that the bank simply puts much too small to make any dent in China’s excess capacity problem—even if it were the sole supplier for these projects. (Dollar, 2015).

These initiatives serve foreign policy that emphasizes pluralism to balance power in the international system, and multilateralism is an effective way to limit the power of the American pole. In addition, China uses its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Security Council to support its reformist vision of the international system, whether by voting for the Security Council or defending its economic interests, through WTO mechanisms (China Foreign Policy and External Relations, 2015).

Pluralism was founded by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader and architect of China's economic reform, which began in 1979 and upon which the current economic development is based, expresses the other side of China's peaceful rise to China. His philosophy focuses on progressing progressively and peacefully, without seeking international leadership, respecting
other nations, and accepting pluralism in the international system. Therefore, China adheres to its position in the international system as a developing country and remains silent towards a number of international issues (Buzan, 2011).

This choice was made for the peaceful rise because the data of the international system has sharply changed from the time of the WW1 and WW2, until the Cold War. This peaceful rise was the basis, by which China managed to calm down the international fears represented by China's economic progress and its military development would be coupled with international fear of its leadership of Asia, including the world, which could, in turn, lead to a clash with the United States of America. The peaceful rise also has enabled China to establish major economic partnerships with the United States and the European Union, and to build a cooperative network of countries with new states and territories, unlike its traditional allies.

The most important characteristics of China's development can be identified as follows:

- The centralized leadership: the Chinese political system is centralized leadership, making the government the main player in the process of economic development (Ismail, 2017).

- Opening to the outside and learning from other styles: China benefited from the development experiences in Japan and had access to the advanced technology, modern management style (The Economist, 2008).

- Sustainability and adaptability: China depends on the development of experience and evaluation, then re-experience and re-evaluation (Nuo, 2009).

China’s astonishing growth over the past 30 years has been achieved by the government’s focus on the agricultural development, which is unprecedented in its scale and persistence; China can boast growth that most of other countries can only dream of. Additionally, the country’s leadership is relying on R&D to play an important part in helping China to transition to a service-based economy, placing innovation at the center of its plan for Chinese development over the next five years. It should be highlighted that the Chinese R&D is spending an impressive 15% of the world’s total and this is likely to increase (Yinuo, 2016).

Second, Given the prevailing focus on its rapid economic rise, it is easy to forget that poverty remains one of its greatest challenges; seventy million Chinese people still live in extreme poverty (compared with 300 million in India, 100 million in Nigeria, and 25 million in Ethiopia), struggling to survive, often in appalling conditions. While China’s economic
success over the past decades has indeed been remarkable, the sheer size of its population, in terms of GDP per capita, it still ranks only 83rd in the world. What’s more, it suffers from dangerous levels of income inequality (Yinuo, 2016).

Third, with a truly remarkable track record, China is undoubtedly a world-leader in poverty reduction and improving health outcomes and there is a lot the rest of the world can learn from its experience. Last year, the world celebrated the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and set out new targets to reach by 2030. The first target of the MDGs, to halve global poverty within 15 years, was realized several years before the 2015 deadline, a spectacular achievement. To tell the truth, China would be justified in claiming considerable credit for this success; an astonishing 439 million of the approximately one billion people, who have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, were Chinese. In 2015, the UNDP calculated that China has contributed to 76% of all global poverty reduction (Yinuo, 2016).

B. The Second Level: The United States of America, and its Readiness to Face Chinese Competition.

The United States realizes that it is still the greatest pole in the international system, with the world's largest economy and the largest military power, and that the near future may witness its continuation of this status. But at the same time, as its determination to rank first in the world continues, the gap between US and its successor is declining, which may change the status of American leadership of the international system, even if it may take several years (Art, 2010).

At the same time, the United States is strengthening its relations with the traditional Asian allies to counter the Chinese rise, but it knows well that its relations with China are at the center of American relations in Asia (Denmark & Patel, 2009, p.12).

The United States also doesn't overlook the fact that the growth rate of the Chinese economy - even after its decline - is expected to continue in the medium term at about 6%, an average above the average compared to the growth rates of the economies of the major industrial countries, especially the United States of America, which has experienced a decline in growth rates in recent years (The Honorable Kevin Rudd, 2015). Therefore, the United States believes that China possess at least the elements of the international pole compared to other
emerging countries internationally, where China is superior in size and population to other countries, such as India and Brazil (Jacques, 2009).

In any case, the United States recognizes the importance of preserving the cooperative feature of its relations with China, despite the state of competition between them. That is, they represent a state of intense interdependence in relations that differ, for example, from the form of relations between them and the former Soviet Union. During the bipolar era, when the trade between the United States and the Soviet Union was limited, the ups and downs of political positions, the intensity of the conflict between the parties, each pole had a list of allies. That list was the basis for economic cooperation and trade, as well as international support for common positions and interests. This situation is entirely different from China and the United States, where interdependence has become the basis of balance in the relations between the two sides, and their keenness to prevent the occurrence of a clash or a clear disagreement between them, even with a state of disagreement in the trends or divergence in support of international positions, or to defend the interests of certain State.

If China’s economic, military, and geopolitical influence continues to rise at even a modest pace during the next few decades, the world will witness the largest shift in the global distribution of power since the rise of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And, if China surpasses the United States as the world’s largest economy in the next 10 to 15 years, it will mark the first time in centuries that the world’s economic leader will be non-English speaking, non-Western, and nondemocratic (Johnson, 2016).

C. The Third Level: Interactions in the International Order.

The third and last level is the international order, which is really the product of the Westphalian Convention in 1648 of more than three centuries ago. It will, therefore, be difficult to determine how the international regime will become in the next phase, as this shift must take some time, but it is certain that the countries in this system, especially China, tend to consolidate pluralism, through the orientation towards regional and international organizations, although not yet qualified to adopt collective positions through these organizations (Langenhove, 2010). Here, some believe that the concept of superpowers, which emerged after the Second World War, may not be appropriate for the interpretation of the current international relations and the nature of the existing international order. Because of the power distribution situation in the current system is relatively fragmented, polarization may
not be appropriate to explain the nature of relations, but it is best to focus on policies with international influence (Breslin, 2010).

According to this trend, the term major powers becomes more relevant and more measurable. The United States’ dominance of leading the international system as a larger pole is an idea that will often remain valid for years to come, but with the rise of other powers, led by China, the concept of major powers imposes a reality in the international system, in return for the retreat of the idea of superpoles or superpowers. The difference here is that the superpowers extend their influence to the international system as a whole, in accordance with its advanced economic, military, and political status, whereas major powers have an essentially regional effect (Buzan, 2011). The emerging powers of the current international order, such as China and Brazil, are generally more concerned at home than abroad, unlike the major powers (Ikenberry, 2014).

The fact is that the world order is undergoing a transformation. For example, China's march to become a leader of the international system is different from that of the previous superpowers, or from other historical examples (Breslin, 2010). The difference in the experience of China's rise is also related to interactions in the international system as a whole, which is experiencing a flow of wealth in the South, linked to the redistribution of the force, which is gradually moving from north to south. The Chinese rise from other past experiences is historically different in that it created a state of interdependence and huge common interests, which emerged among the world's two largest economies. Despite the extent of differences on the ideological side, alliances are no longer based on ideological agreement, where the state of interdependence is the center of understanding the nature of the current international system, and predict the future.

If the United States manages the global economic system through its leadership of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, China will create parallel institutions, which receive relatively large support and run large financial portfolios, which means that China is keen not to clash directly with the United States, but is keen to develop the mechanisms of the global economy and adapt them to serve their development goals, and sometimes, expansion through movements at the regional level initially, and the impact of these engines is expected to extend to the international level as a whole (Ikenberry, 2016).
China interacts with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea at four levels: human relations, economic and financial interaction, diplomatic and political relations, and military relations. The temperature of relations at each level ranges from cold to hot depending on the type of interaction and country or state being considered. At the human level, the temperatures are mixed, at the economic level are hot, at the diplomatic level are cold for Taiwan to warm for South Korea, and at the military level, temperatures of interaction are cold.

The implications of China’s globalization and rise as a major economic power can be seen in its impact both on Beijing and on policy deliberations in Taipei, Tokyo, and Seoul. The Chinese Communist leadership does not only have to cede space in its decision making process to industrial interests but the leaders themselves are also coming into power with experience in the transformation of society that comes from development and modernization after opening to the outside world. China now depends on international investment and trade for the economic growth needed to maintain the party’s legitimacy.

For China’s trading partners, dependency on the Chinese market means that Beijing is looming larger in all aspects of policy making. While this is not likely to challenge U.S. security ties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it raises several policy issues. One is how to deal with a modernizing and more powerful Chinese military financed by the growing Chinese economy. Another is how to explicitly incorporate into U.S. policy the greater weight that Beijing is being given in policy deliberations in Tokyo and Seoul. A further policy issue is whether to take explicit measures to offset the rising economic clout of China and attempts by Beijing to create East Asian institutions with China at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery. A positive result of the mutual trade and financial dependency that has developed in northeast Asia is that all parties now have much to lose by an international military crisis that would interrupt economic and financial flows in the region (Nanto & Avery, 2006).
Fourth: The Dilemmas of Turning China into an International Pole.

The radical changes in China's political structure led to a shift in China's perspective on international relations. The ideological Maoist perspective that dominated from 1949-1976 has changed, and the call for dialogue has became a Chinese demand at the international level. The theory of peaceful rise, which is one of the indicators of the profound shift in China's perspective on international relations, has its roots in the principle of peaceful co-existence introduced by the Soviet Union at that time. The researcher will address the most important dilemmas that hinder the turn of China into an international pole under the current international system, as follows:

1. Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of Other States

Non-interference in the internal affairs of the other countries and respect of their sovereignty and peaceful coexistence are fundamental principles of China's foreign policy. If some believe that China has not adhered to those principles in all cases and events due to Beijing's support for pre-reform and opening up of liberal movements in developing countries, its military conflict with Vietnam in 1979, and its wars from (1949 – 1978) with India, Russia, and the United States of America in Korea (Brawn, 2013), Beijing's post-reform and opening-up positions confirm that China adheres to those principles in word and deed, as revealed by a review of statements by Chinese officials and China's positions during that period. China does not link its foreign aid with political conditions; Beijing has always shown remarkable ability to establish close cooperative relations with countries that adopt different ideologies and different regimes.

The dilemma of non-interference stems from the difficulty of China's pursuit of its non-interference policy, on which an important aspect of its global economic standing depends. If adopted by any tendency to make a global polar shift, such a shift will stimulate many processes of revision and conflict across many regions of the world that are vital to China's economic and even strategic interests, as the Middle East is witnessing at the moment. If China's global economic standing has been strengthened by this policy of non-interference and impartiality, China's non-interference does not guarantee the settlement and resolution of conflicts that threaten Chinese interests.

There is a wrong connection between the principle of non-interference and the role that China should play on the international arena. Some believe that China may find itself forced in the coming years to take decisive positions on issues that in the past were avoided as being outside
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its sphere of influence. China's economic strength now means that its political and diplomatic power has become one of the most influential new international powers. China has been playing only the second half of the game in the Middle East, namely, economy, while its first-half participation in the security, political and military aspects is still limited.

There are voices within China asking it to participate in the first half, but this development in China's vision of the principle of non-interference is still in the academic framework. The new generation of Chinese elites is clearly expressed, but not supported by decisive official positions. It will be difficult to see a Chinese shift from the policy of non-interference in the foreseeable future. If China's policy of "walking by the wall" served China well, preventing it from getting involved in the complex problems of the Middle East and other regions, and enabling it to build strong networks of relations with many circles, without leading to a collision with the United States of America (Brawn, 2013); the benefits of leaving China's policy of non-interference are still far below adherence.

Beijing maintains that it adheres to a policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, because otherwise it won’t be able to fight back when the West interferes in China’s domestic affairs. However, Western countries’ interference inside China doesn’t go beyond talking and China is now a large power, not a small one, and it has enough methods and resources to fight back. Moreover, even if Beijing advocates non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, Western countries will continue to criticize China over human rights and other issues. China, therefore, should intervene in other countries’ internal affairs expressing concern when they severely violate human rights, and use its influence to push for improvement — but not pushing for regime change like the West does. This would create a new and better image for China that although Beijing cares about human rights, it won’t use human rights as an excuse to mask other interests.

2. Avoid Collisions with Washington.

The relationship between Beijing and Washington is one of the most important and complex international relations in the 21st century and Washington is Beijing's biggest trading partner; Beijing is Washington's third largest partner as well. The two countries, despite their divergent views, have cooperated in important regional and international issues, like the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the fight against terrorism, and the Iranian nuclear file. In general, each party's emphasis on dealing with the different issues is linked to the extent of its influence on its direct strategic interests. For instance, China's positions on issues, such as maritime border
disputes, the disputes over the East China Sea islands and the South China Sea are tough, while its positions on issues not directly related to its strategic interests and national security are flexible, such as its position on the Ukrainian issue and the conflicts in the Middle East. The Asian-Pacific region has become the main arena for Chinese-US competition since Washington announced in 2010 that its strategy would be modified to be the Asian-Pacific region through the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership (Ismail, 2017, p.17).

The United States also seeks to contain China by consolidating its old military alliances with Japan and South Korea, and strengthening ties with countries, such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and other countries with disagreement with China. To build new bases for US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and away from the main arena of Chinese-US competition, Washington deliberately raises issues within China, such as human rights, and support for separatist groups in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The Chinese-American disagreements on many issues around the world are manifestations of the rivalry between a rising world power and another dominant power, whose role is slowly diminishing day by day. These disagreements are still containable and reflect a real divergence in the Chinese concept regarding the political, economic, social and cultural issues in the 1990s. With China's growing economic and military capabilities, China's national sentiment has escalated, and Beijing has always been at a distance from entering into a direct confrontation with Washington (Xinhua News Agency, 2013), even if the latter's provocations have touched the national dignity of the Chinese people.

China has been growing at about 9% per annum and its goods and services are rapidly rising in quality and value. In contrast, the US and Europe have declined around 0% growth from 2007-2012. In addition, China’s innovative techno-scientific establishment routinely assimilates the latest inventions from the West (and Japan) and improves them, thereby decreasing the cost of production. Moreover, China has replaced the US and European controlled “international financial institutions” (the IMF, World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank) as the principal lender in Latin America. China also continues to lead as the prime investor in African energy and mineral resources and replaced the US as the principal market for Saudi Arabia, Sudanese and Iranian petroleum and it will soon replace the US as the principal market for Venezuela petroleum products. Today, China is the world’s biggest manufacturer and exporter, dominating even the US market, while playing the role of financial lifeline as it holds over $1.3 trillion in US Treasury notes (Petras, 2012).
Hillary Clinton is regarded in Beijing as a dangerous hawk, who is probably more determined in pushing back against China’s maritime claims and President Xi is a tough-minded nationalist, so a Clinton presidency would increase the chances of a clash in the Pacific between the US and China. Trump, by contrast, seems relatively uninterested in America’s strategic role in the Pacific, but his vociferous protectionism has led him to propose swinging tariffs on the Chinese goods. Any such policy would be regarded as an act of economic warfare by Beijing (Rachman, 2016).

The growth of the Chinese economy has made the strategic interests of China and America more intertwined, and the resolution of the rivalry between the two powers will depend on their ability to manage it wisely without sliding into an abyss that could cost them together a high price. The presidency of the Donald Trump and its administration of the United States will be another difficult test of Beijing's wisdom in managing its relations with Washington.

3. The Dilemma of Rising Power.

The dilemma of rising powers involves two dynamics (Xuefeng, 2012). On one hand, the rising powers have to translate their newly-acquired capabilities into greater national influence to safeguard their expanding national interests; on the other hand, their efforts to increase the national influence always lead to containment and balance by the dominant power and by the neighboring states, who try to hinder the rising power in order to preserve their own. Hence, the rising power always faces dilemmas in varying degrees in its struggle to maintain its momentum while trying to shape a relatively favorable external environment.

A typical example of China’s rising power dilemma is its emerging naval build-up. That is to say, the Chinese economic development has created overseas interests in terms of protecting its expanding imports, direct investment and Chinese citizens around the world. In 2008, there were more than 12,000 Chinese overseas enterprises and China’s FDI had increased from US$0.55 billion in 2000 to US$52.15 billion (www.fdi.gov, 2009). In the same year, more than 45.84 million Chinese citizens had travelled abroad, while the number of Chinese citizens living abroad totaled more than 5 million. In recent years, all levels of the Chinese government have coordinated to handle more than 30,000 consular-protection incidents per year (Xuefeng, 2012).

China’s identity dilemma is defined as the hard choice of identifying itself as either a developing or a developed country. On the one hand, China’s impressive economic rise has resulted in
growing expectations that it will play an even greater role in global events as one of the developed countries, like the US. The G2 concept, coined by an American scholar in 2008, is a typical case in point. On the other hand, a rising China still shares many similarities with the developing countries, especially in terms of per capita GDP, social cohesion and political development. This is why China’s leaders are often aware of the difficulties and risks in identifying China as a developed country, despite its economic growth. As a result of these two dynamics, a rising China faces the dilemma of balancing the responsibility accompanied with its new identity as a developed country and the rights inherent to its accustomed role as a developing country.

4. Economic Crises in China.

Economic crises often provoke policy and political dilemmas. This one is no exception. However, the economists promote the fiction that one size fits all. In other words, there is an ideal economic solution to every problem that is best for everyone. This blog has argued that capitalism is a two-party system. In other words, what benefits one set of interests may be anathema to others. This is especially true during crises when rival interests become sharply polarized, as is true today.

The economic crisis in China presents a stark dilemma not only for Chinese leaders, but also worldwide. The surprising viability of Donald Trump’s campaign for president is one indicator of the extent to which China’s dilemma is being exported to affect the political economy globally. It would be a mistake to underestimate Trump’s campaign as mere name-calling and buffoonery. It is so worrying to the political establishment not merely because of unseemly rhetoric, but because it taps into a viable alternative nationalist policy inimical to the business internationalists that dominate American politics (Nolt, 2016).

The dilemma for China is whether to transition to a consumer-led economy or stay the course, maintaining an export and investment-led economy strategy. Most foreign commentators assume China must make a transition to consumer-led growth. Chinese officials sometimes seem to agree. However, the inertia within the Chinese political economy powerfully resists change.
5. **Careful in Managing External Relations, and not Rushing to seek an Advanced Position in the Structure of the International Order.**

The theory of peaceful rise proposed by Beijing, or the theory of peaceful development, as proposed by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2004, seeks to reassure the world that China is not seeking to rise in a way that could threaten stability in the international system. This theory has formed the framework through which the Chinese government works in the field of international relations, and the concept of security, which China has called the new concept of security in 1998. It is based on the idea that diplomatic, economic and cultural interaction enhance international security more than the Cold War mechanisms that prevailed. Even, the Chinese thinkers believe that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union is its adherence to the concept of traditional security, which is based on the military dimension (Kumar, 2012).

6. **Division within Chinese Society.**

In Chinese society, there is a great divide between developed coastal areas and marginalized inland areas. While coastal regions flourish as a result of encouraging foreign investment into them, the inland regions are suffering from severe stagnation. This disparity results in many negative phenomena, the most important of which is rural-urban migration, which may eliminate the agricultural sector, which suffers from many problems. In addition, there is also an administrative, economic and political dispute among the rich regions due to the capital, and taxes (Kandil, 2014, p.24).

**Conclusion**

It can be said that China has a long-standing cooperative relationship, in which it enjoys strong positions that increase the economic strength of its development process and qualify it to become a "Superpower", but it has not yet reached the status of the equivalent international pole of the United States of America, not to mention the internal challenges that China is sometimes preoccupied with, such as conflicts and divisions within China, as well as China's disagreements with its regional neighbors. China can also use the economic interests as a tool to support the management of these conflicts, at least by establishing a state of interdependence, but China is not expected to become an international pole in the short run, because China's top priority now is facilitating its mission of obtaining resources, opening up markets for its products, and not compromising its sovereignty over its borders and disputed territories. Through China's continued peaceful rise, coupled with the lack of overt Chinese efforts to reach the leadership of
China’s rise will continue to redefine international politics in East Asia. Contrary to many pessimistic assessments, China can rise peacefully. Its growing military and economic power pose major challenges to U.S. dominance in the region, but need not lead to conflict. However, both ambition and insecurity could lead China to challenge the status quo, generating an armed clash with the United States; U.S. strategy must therefore strike a careful balance: its policies must effectively deter attacks against U.S. vital interests, while at the same time not posing a serious threat to China’s security.

Perhaps we will have to wait until the 20th National Congress of the CPC in 2022 so that we can be able to speak of a clear, specific and perhaps the decisive Chinese role in shaping the international order in all its manifestations.

Footnotes

1. The "Belt and Road" initiative initiated by China emanates from the spirit of the Silk Road, which is peace and cooperation, openness and tolerance, mutual learning, mutual benefit, mutual benefit and common win, policy coherence, road interlink age, trade, currency trading and understanding of the mentalities as their main content. It aims to practice regional cooperation, promote regular and free trade of economic factors, and accelerate interlink ages between Asia, Europe, Africa and the surrounding seas as well as unleashing the potential strength of the intraregional markets, creating new opportunities for growth and employment, and elevating Asia's position in the world's supply chain.

2. The investment bank is an unofficial bank of the World Bank, and China has a voting power at the World Bank estimated at 4.78% if compared to the United States, which surpasses China, with a voting power of 16%. In the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing has 30.3% of its voting power, while the United States is not a member. Israel made the right decision when joined the bank in 2015 despite Washington's objection to this, as its membership in this bank will allow it to influence the direction of investments to where it wants. Through projects selected by the bank to support
them, the bank’s investment in projects related to the Middle East will benefit Israel. These projects help to develop their economy, achieve some degree of stability, and reduce the potential threats to their security.

3. The Theory of Peaceful Rise, and the so-called fourth generation of Chinese leadership is based on a number of fundamentals to reassure the world that China's economic growth will not become a tool to feed aggression against other countries, link security and development of the soft power tools of the state and the international community and reassure the Chinese neighbors that economic growth will not involve a Chinese expansionism at their expense.

4. China has also set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, which many see it as a rival to the World Bank and one of China's tools to balance US and Arab influence in the world. The AIIB is also an unofficial competitor of the World Bank (WB). Specifically speaking, in the WB, China has 4.78% voting power in comparison to the US’s 16%, whereas at the AIIB Beijing has 30.3% voting power, while Washington is not a member at all. More importantly, the AIIB allows China to use funds to promote projects in the Middle East as well as in Asia.

5. The international pole, as embodied in the strategic history of the world, means that a state will sacrifice the center of gravity, dominance, master and reference for a particular bloc of States within a particular international system, whether it is a global system or merely a regional system. This historical pattern assumes the concept of polarization, in addition to the desire of the state to acquire this status and the will to play the roles it entails, and to bear the burdens of the totalitarian and non-selective nature imposed by it, that the strengths of this country / pole have two basic characteristics: First, a high degree of independence in the face of other international forces, limiting the latter's ability to influence the polar area of the State / Pole, as well as in the face of the States that includes this polar area, thereby precluding the possibility of such policies being pursued by States in the face of State / pole policies. Secondly, a comprehensive character in the concentration of the different economic, military, ideological, political, and ideological elements of the State / Pole so as to prevent the states involved in a given polar area from relying on other international actors for any of these elements.

6. Under the dilemma of non-interference, Chinese diplomacy has attempted to adopt a mediation and good offices approach to reduce tension and conflict in areas that affect its interests, as happened when the peace talks between the Afghan government and
the Taliban were hosted, but that peaceful mediation diplomacy can't work in all conflicts. It may also raise the concern of other international parties of China's increasing role, which leads to the complexity of those conflicts to impede the role of China.

7. On 25 November 2013, when two US B-52 bombers flew over the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea without reporting to Beijing and ignoring the actions taken by the Chinese Government to deploy the coordinates of the air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, China has warned that it will take urgent defensive measures against aircraft that are reluctant to be identified while flying in airspace. When a US warship, on October 27, 2015, entered an area prepared by China within its territorial waters, it expressed strong displeasure and strong rejection, "The actions of the United States of America threaten China's sovereignty and security interests and harm peace and stability in the region," said a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman.

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الازدهار والصعود الصيني في ظل النظام الدولي الحالي: مستوياته ومعضلاته

إسلام عيادي

باحثة في العلاقات الدولية، قسم اللغة العربية والإعلام، الجامعة العربية الأمريكية - فلسطين

Islam.aiadi@aauj.edu

الملخص

تتناول هذه الدراسة الازدهار والصعود الصيني الذي يعزز مكانتها الدولية، التي بدأت تحظى بها، وتقدمها السريع لتصبح واحدة من أهم الدول التي تعد مصدرًا للاستثمارات الخارجية المباشرة، بما يتيح لها ذلك، ليس فقط في تعزيز مكانتها وحضورها وفوؤدها في العديد من الدول حول العالم، خاصة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، التي تعد المستقبل الأول للاستثمارات الصينية في الخارج، ولكن في تحول الصين، وانسجام نموها الاقتصادي ليصبحا من الأيقونات الرئيسية لاستقرار الاقتصاد العالمي، وتعافيه من الركود الاقتصادي المتواصل منذ الأزمة العالمية عام 2008.

ويهدف هذا المقال إلى تحديد مستويات صعود الصين ومعضلاته في النظام الدولي، وقد ثبت من خلال هذه الدراسة أن الصين لم تصل بعد إلى وضع القطب الدولي المكافئ للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، كما أنه من غير المتوقع أن تصبح الصين قطباً دولياً في المدى القريب.

وإنها قد تصل إلى مكانتها الاقتصادية كبري في العالم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الصعود الصيني، الصين، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، النظام الدولي، قطب دولي، معضلة.